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Aristotle on Friendship.PDF
Nicomachean Ethics
Book 8, Chapter 1
AFTER what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally follow, since it is a virtue or
implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one
would choose to live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in possession of
office and of dominating power are thought to need friends most of all; for what is the use of such
prosperity without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its most
laudable form towards friends? Or how can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends?
The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other misfortunes men think
friends are the only refuge. It helps the young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by
ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that are failing from weakness; those in
the prime of life it stimulates to noble actions-'two going together'-for with friends men are more
able both to think and to act. Again, parent seems by nature to feel it for offspring and offspring
for parent, not only among men but among birds and among most animals; it is felt mutually by
members of the same race, and especially by men, whence we praise lovers of their fellowmen.
We may even in our travels how near and dear every man is to every other. Friendship seems too
to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for it than for justice; for unanimity seems to
be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst
enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need
friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.
But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who love their friends, and it is
thought to be a fine thing to have many friends; and again we think it is the same people that are
good men and are friends.
Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some define it as a kind of likeness and
say like people are friends, whence come the sayings 'like to like', 'birds of a feather flock
together', and so on; others on the contrary say 'two of a trade never agree'. On this very question
they inquire for deeper and more physical causes, Euripides saying that 'parched earth loves the
rain, and stately heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to earth', and Heraclitus that 'it is what
opposes that helps' and 'from different tones comes the fairest tune' and 'all things are produced
through strife'; while Empedocles, as well as others, expresses the opposite view that like aims at
like. The physical problems we may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present inquiry); let
us examine those which are human and involve character and feeling, e.g. whether friendship can
arise between any two people or people cannot be friends if they are wicked, and whether there is
one species of friendship or more than one. Those who think there is only one because it admits of
degrees have relied on an inadequate indication; for even things different in species admit of
degree. We have discussed this matter previously.
Book 8, Chapter 2
The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to know the object of love.
For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful;
but it would seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced that is useful, so that it
is the good and the useful that are lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the good, or what is good
for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. Now it is thought that each
loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is
good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not what is good for him but what
seems good. This however will make no difference; we shall just have to say that this is 'that
which seems lovable'. Now there are three grounds on which people love; of the love of lifeless
objects we do not use the word 'friendship'; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a wishing of
good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to wish wine well; if one wishes anything for
it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself); but to a friend we say we ought to wish
what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish
is not reciprocated; goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship. Or must we add 'when it is
recognized'? For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be
good or useful; and one of these might return this feeling. These people seem to bear goodwill to
each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings? To
be friends, then, the must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each
other for one of the aforesaid reasons.
Book 8, Chapter 3
Now these reasons differ from each other in kind; so, therefore, do the corresponding forms of
love and friendship. There are therefore three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things
that are lovable; for with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love, and those who
love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another. Now those
who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some
good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it is
not for their character that men love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant.
Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves,
and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves,
and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. And thus
these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is
loved, but as providing some good or pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the
parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other
ceases to love him.
Now the useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the motive of the friendship
is done away, the friendship is dissolved, inasmuch as it existed only for the ends in question. This
kind of friendship seems to exist chiefly between old people (for at that age people pursue not the
pleasant but the useful) and, of those who are in their prime or young, between those who pursue
utility. And such people do not live much with each other either; for sometimes they do not even
find each other pleasant; therefore they do not need such companionship unless they are useful to
each other; for they are pleasant to each other only in so far as they rouse in each other hopes of
something good to come. Among such friendships people also class the friendship of a host and
guest. On the other hand the friendship of young people seems to aim at pleasure; for they live
under the guidance of emotion, and pursue above all what is pleasant to themselves and what is
immediately before them; but with increasing age their pleasures become different. This is why
they quickly become friends and quickly cease to be so; their friendship changes with the object
that is found pleasant, and such pleasure alters quickly. Young people are amorous too; for the
greater part of the friendship of love depends on emotion and aims at pleasure; this is why they
fall in love and quickly fall out of love, changing often within a single day. But these people do
wish to spend their days and lives together; for it is thus that they attain the purpose of their
friendship.
Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well
alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves. Now those who wish well to their
friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of own nature and not
incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good-and goodness is an enduring
thing. And each is good without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both good
without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant
both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them
are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like. And such a friendship is as might
be expected permanent, since there meet in it all the qualities that friends should have. For all
friendship is for the sake of good or of pleasure-good or pleasure either in the abstract or such as
will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling-and is based on a certain resemblance; and to a
friendship of good men all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of the nature of the
friends themselves; for in the case of this kind of friendship the other qualities also are alike in
both friends, and that which is good without qualification is also without qualification pleasant,
and these are the most lovable qualities. Love and friendship therefore are found most and in their
best form between such men.
But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such men are rare. Further, such
friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they
have 'eaten salt together'; nor can they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has
been found lovable and been trusted by each. Those who quickly show the marks of friendship to
each other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are lovable and know the fact;
for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not.
Book 8, Chapter 4
This kind of friendship, then, is perfect both in respect of duration and in all other respects, and in
it each gets from each in all respects the same as, or something like what, he gives; which is what
ought to happen between friends. Friendship for the sake of pleasure bears a resemblance to this
kind; for good people too are pleasant to each other. So too does friendship for the sake of utility;
for the good are also useful to each other. Among men of these inferior sorts too, friendships are
most permanent when the friends get the same thing from each other (e.g. pleasure), and not only
that but also from the same source, as happens between readywitted people, not as happens
between lover and beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same things, but the one in
seeing the beloved and the other in receiving attentions from his lover; and when the bloom of
youth is passing the friendship sometimes passes too (for the one finds no pleasure in the sight of
the other, and the other gets no attentions from the first); but many lovers on the other hand are
constant, if familiarity has led them to love each other's characters, these being alike. But those
who exchange not pleasure but utility in their amour are both less truly friends and less constant.
Those who are friends for the sake of utility part when the advantage is at an end; for they were
lovers not of each other but of profit.
For the sake of pleasure or utility, then, even bad men may be friends of each other, or good men
of bad, or one who is neither good nor bad may be a friend to any sort of person, but for their
own sake clearly only good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in each other unless
some advantage come of the relation.
The friendship of the good too and this alone is proof against slander; for it is not easy to trust
any one talk about a man who has long been tested by oneself; and it is among good men that
trust and the feeling that 'he would never wrong me' and all the other things that are demanded in
true friendship are found. In the other kinds of friendship, however, there is nothing to prevent
these evils arising. For men apply the name of friends even to those whose motive is utility, in
which sense states are said to be friendly (for the alliances of states seem to aim at advantage),
and to those who love each other for the sake of pleasure, in which sense children are called
friends. Therefore we too ought perhaps to call such people friends, and say that there are several
kinds of friendship-firstly and in the proper sense that of good men qua good, and by analogy the
other kinds; for it is in virtue of something good and something akin to what is found in true
friendship that they are friends, since even the pleasant is good for the lovers of pleasure. But
these two kinds of friendship are not often united, nor do the same people become friends for the
sake of utility and of pleasure; for things that are only incidentally connected are not often
coupled together.
Friendship being divided into these kinds, bad men will be friends for the sake of pleasure or of
utility, being in this respect like each other, but good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e. in
virtue of their goodness. These, then, are friends without qualification; the others are friends
incidentally and through a resemblance to these.
Book 8, Chapter 5
As in regard to the virtues some men are called good in respect of a state of character, others in
respect of an activity, so too in the case of friendship; for those who live together delight in each
other and confer benefits on each other, but those who are asleep or locally separated are not
performing, but are disposed to perform, the activities of friendship; distance does not break off
the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually
to make men forget their friendship; hence the saying 'out of sight, out of mind'. Neither old
people nor sour people seem to make friends easily; for there is little that is pleasant in them, and
no one can spend his days with one whose company is painful, or not pleasant, since nature seems
above all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant. Those, however, who approve of each
other but do not live together seem to be well-disposed rather than actual friends. For there is
nothing so characteristic of friends as living together (since while it people who are in need that
desire benefits, even those who are supremely happy desire to spend their days together; for
solitude suits such people least of all); but people cannot live together if they are not pleasant and
do not enjoy the same things, as friends who are companions seem to do.
The truest friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have frequently said; for that which is
without qualification good or pleasant seems to be lovable and desirable, and for each person that
which is good or pleasant to him; and the good man is lovable and desirable to the good man for
both these reasons. Now it looks as if love were a feeling, friendship a state of character; for love
may be felt just as much towards lifeless things, but mutual love involves choice and choice
springs from a state of character; and men wish well to those whom they love, for their sake, not
as a result of feeling but as a result of a state of character. And in loving a friend men love what is
good for themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a good to his friend. Each,
then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal return in goodwill and in
pleasantness; for friendship is said to be equality, and both of these are found most in the
friendship of the good.
Book 8, Chapter 6
Between sour and elderly people friendship arises less readily, inasmuch as they are less
good-tempered and enjoy companionship less; for these are thou to be the greatest marks of
friendship productive of it. This is why, while men become friends quickly, old men do not; it is
because men do not become friends with those in whom they do not delight; and similarly sour
people do not quickly make friends either. But such men may bear goodwill to each other; for
they wish one another well and aid one another in need; but they are hardly friends because they
do not spend their days together nor delight in each other, and these are thought the greatest
marks of friendship.
One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with
them, just as one cannot be in love with many people at once (for love is a sort of excess of
feeling, and it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one person); and it is not easy for many
people at the same time to please the same person very greatly, or perhaps even to be good in his
eyes. One must, too, acquire some experience of the other person and become familiar with him,
and that is very hard. But with a view to utility or pleasure it is possible that many people should
please one; for many people are useful or pleasant, and these services take little time.
Of these two kinds that which is for the sake of pleasure is the more like friendship, when both
parties get the same things from each other and delight in each other or in the things, as in the
friendships of the young; for generosity is more found in such friendships. Friendship based on
utility is for the commercially minded. People who are supremely happy, too, have no need of
useful friends, but do need pleasant friends; for they wish to live with some one and, though they
can endure for a short time what is painful, no one could put up with it continuously, nor even
with the Good itself if it were painful to him; this is why they look out for friends who are
pleasant. Perhaps they should look out for friends who, being pleasant, are also good, and good
for them too; for so they will have all the characteristics that friends should have.
People in positions of authority seem to have friends who fall into distinct classes; some people
are useful to them and others are pleasant, but the same people are rarely both; for they seek
neither those whose pleasantness is accompanied by virtue nor those whose utility is with a view
to noble objects, but in their desire for pleasure they seek for ready-witted people, and their other
friends they choose as being clever at doing what they are told, and these characteristics are rarely
combined. Now we have said that the good man is at the same time pleasant and useful; but such
a man does not become the friend of one who surpasses him in station, unless he is surpassed also
in virtue; if this is not so, he does not establish equality by being proportionally exceeded in both
respects. But people who surpass him in both respects are not so easy to find.
However that may be, the aforesaid friendships involve equality; for the friends get the same
things from one another and wish the same things for one another, or exchange one thing for
another, e.g. pleasure for utility; we have said, however, that they are both less truly friendships
and less permanent.
But it is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing that they are thought both to be
and not to be friendships. It is by their likeness to the friendship of virtue that they seem to be
friendships (for one of them involves pleasure and the other utility, and these characteristics
belong to the friendship of virtue as well); while it is because the friendship of virtue is proof
against slander and permanent, while these quickly change (besides differing from the former in
many other respects), that they appear not to be friendships; i.e. it is because of their unlikeness to
the friendship of virtue.
Book 8, Chapter 7
But there is another kind of friendship, viz. that which involves an inequality between the parties,
e.g. that of father to son and in general of elder to younger, that of man to wife and in general that
of ruler to subject. And these friendships differ also from each other; for it is not the same that
exists between parents and children and between rulers and subjects, nor is even that of father to
son the same as that of son to father, nor that of husband to wife the same as that of wife to
husband. For the virtue and the function of each of these is different, and so are the reasons for
which they love; the love and the friendship are therefore different also. Each party, then, neither
gets the same from the other, nor ought to seek it; but when children render to parents what they
ought to render to those who brought them into the world, and parents render what they should
to their children, the friendship of such persons will be abiding and excellent. In all friendships
implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved than
he loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other cases; for when the love
is in proportion to the merit of the parties, then in a sense arises equality, which is certainly held to
be characteristic of friendship.
But equality does not seem to take the same form in acts of justice and in friendship; for in acts of
justice what is equal in the primary sense is that which is in proportion to merit, while quantitative
equality is secondary, but in friendship quantitative equality is primary and proportion to merit
secondary. This becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect of virtue or vice or wealth or
anything else between the parties; for then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to
be so. And this is most manifest in the case of the gods; for they surpass us most decisively in all
good things. But it is clear also in the case of kings; for with them, too, men who are much their
inferiors do not expect to be friends; nor do men of no account expect to be friends with the best
or wisest men. In such cases it is not possible to define exactly up to what point friends can
remain friends; for much can be taken away and friendship remain, but when one party is removed
to a great distance, as God is, the possibility of friendship ceases. This is in fact the origin of the
question whether friends really wish for their friends the greatest goods, e.g. that of being gods;
since in that case their friends will no longer be friends to them, and therefore will not be good
things for them (for friends are good things). The answer is that if we were right in saying that
friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend must remain the sort of being he is, whatever
that may be; therefore it is for him oily so long as he remains a man that he will wish the greatest
goods. But perhaps not all the greatest goods; for it is for himself most of all that each man
wishes what is good.
Book 8, Chapter 8
Most people seem, owing to ambition, to wish to be loved rather than to love; which is why most
men love flattery; for the flatterer is a friend in an inferior position, or pretends to be such and to
love more than he is loved; and being loved seems to be akin to being honoured, and this is what
most people aim at. But it seems to be not for its own sake that people choose honour, but
incidentally. For most people enjoy being honoured by those in positions of authority because of
their hopes (for they think that if they want anything they will get it from them; and therefore they
delight in honour as a token of favour to come); while those who desire honour from good men,
and men who know, are aiming at confirming their own opinion of themselves; they delight in
honour, therefore, because they believe in their own goodness on the strength of the judgement of
those who speak about them. In being loved, on the other hand, people delight for its own sake;
whence it would seem to be better than being honoured, and friendship to be desirable in itself.
But it seems to lie in loving rather than in being loved, as is indicated by the delight mothers take
in loving; for some mothers hand over their children to be brought up, and so long as they know
their fate they love them and do not seek to be loved in return (if they cannot have both), but
seem to be satisfied if they see them prospering; and they themselves love their children even if
these owing to their ignorance give them nothing of a mother's due. Now since friendship depends
more on loving, and it is those who love their friends that are praised, loving seems to be the
characteristic virtue of friends, so that it is only those in whom this is found in due measure that
are lasting friends, and only their friendship that endures.
It is in this way more than any other that even unequals can be friends; they can be equalized.
Now equality and likeness are friendship, and especially the likeness of those who are like in
virtue; for being steadfast in themselves they hold fast to each other, and neither ask nor give base
services, but (one may say) even prevent them; for it is characteristic of good men neither to go
wrong themselves nor to let their friends do so. But wicked men have no steadfastness (for they
do not remain even like to themselves), but become friends for a short time because they delight in
each other's wickedness. Friends who are useful or pleasant last longer; i.e. as long as they
provide each other with enjoyments or advantages. Friendship for utility's sake seems to be that
which most easily exists between contraries, e.g. between poor and rich, between ignorant and
learned; for what a man actually lacks he aims at, and one gives something else in return. But
under this head, too, might bring lover and beloved, beautiful and ugly. This is why lovers
sometimes seem ridiculous, when they demand to be loved as they love; if they are equally lovable
their claim can perhaps be justified, but when they have nothing lovable about them it is
ridiculous. Perhaps, however, contrary does not even aim at contrary by its own nature, but only
incidentally, the desire being for what is intermediate; for that is what is good, e.g. it is good for
the dry not to become wet but to come to the intermediate state, and similarly with the hot and in
all other cases. These subjects we may dismiss; for they are indeed somewhat foreign to our
inquiry.
Book 8, Chapter 9
Friendship and justice seem, as we have said at the outset of our discussion, to be concerned with
the same objects and exhibited between the same persons. For in every community there is
thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too; at least men address as friends their
fellow-voyagers and fellowsoldiers, and so too those associated with them in any other kind of
community. And the extent of their association is the extent of their friendship, as it is the extent
to which justice exists between them. And the proverb 'what friends have is common property'
expresses the truth; for friendship depends on community. Now brothers and comrades have all
things in common, but the others to whom we have referred have definite things in common-some
more things, others fewer; for of friendships, too, some are more and others less truly friendships.
And the claims of justice differ too; the duties of parents to children, and those of brothers to each
other are not the same, nor those of comrades and those of fellow- citizens, and so, too, with the
other kinds of friendship. There is a difference, therefore, also between the acts that are unjust
towards each of these classes of associates, and the injustice increases by being exhibited towards
those who are friends in a fuller sense; e.g. it is a more terrible thing to defraud a comrade than a
fellow-citizen, more terrible not to help a brother than a stranger, and more terrible to wound a
father than any one else. And the demands of justice also seem to increase with the intensity of the
friendship, which implies that friendship and justice exist between the same persons and have an
equal extension.
Now all forms of community are like parts of the political community; for men journey together
with a view to some particular advantage, and to provide something that they need for the
purposes of life; and it is for the sake of advantage that the political community too seems both to
have come together originally and to endure, for this is what legislators aim at, and they call just
that which is to the common advantage. Now the other communities aim at advantage bit by bit,
e.g. sailors at what is advantageous on a voyage with a view to making money or something of
the kind, fellow-soldiers at what is advantageous in war, whether it is wealth or victory or the
taking of a city that they seek, and members of tribes and demes act similarly (Some communities
seem to arise for the sake or pleasure, viz. religious guilds and social clubs; for these exist
respectively for the sake of offering sacrifice and of companionship. But all these seem to fall
under the political community; for it aims not at present advantage but at what is advantageous
for life as a whole), offering sacrifices and arranging gatherings for the purpose, and assigning
honours to the gods, and providing pleasant relaxations for themselves. For the ancient sacrifices
and gatherings seem to take place after the harvest as a sort of firstfruits, because it was at these
seasons that people had most leisure. All the communities, then, seem to be parts of the political
community; and the particular kinds friendship will correspond to the particular kinds of
community.
Book 8, Chapter 10
There are three kinds of constitution, and an equal number of deviation-forms--perversions, as it
were, of them. The constitutions are monarchy, aristocracy, and thirdly that which is based on a
property qualification, which it seems appropriate to call timocratic, though most people are wont
to call it polity. The best of these is monarchy, the worst timocracy. The deviation from monarchy
is tyrany; for both are forms of one-man rule, but there is the greatest difference between them;
the tyrant looks to his own advantage, the king to that of his subjects. For a man is not a king
unless he is sufficient to himself and excels his subjects in all good things; and such a man needs
nothing further; therefore he will not look to his own interests but to those of his subjects; for a
king who is not like that would be a mere titular king. Now tyranny is the very contrary of this;
the tyrant pursues his own good. And it is clearer in the case of tyranny that it is the worst
deviation-form; but it is the contrary of the best that is worst. Monarchy passes over into tyranny;
for tyranny is the evil form of one-man rule and the bad king becomes a tyrant. Aristocracy passes
over into oligarchy by the badness of the rulers, who distribute contrary to equity what belongs to
the city-all or most of the good things to themselves, and office always to the same people, paying
most regard to wealth; thus the rulers are few and are bad men instead of the most worthy.
Timocracy passes over into democracy; for these are coterminous, since it is the ideal even of
timocracy to be the rule of the majority, and all who have the property qualification count as
equal. Democracy is the least bad of the deviations; for in its case the form of constitution is but a
slight deviation. These then are the changes to which constitutions are most subject; for these are
the smallest and easiest transitions.
One may find resemblances to the constitutions and, as it were, patterns of them even in
households. For the association of a father with his sons bears the form of monarchy, since the
father cares for his children; and this is why Homer calls Zeus 'father'; it is the ideal of monarchy
to be paternal rule. But among the Persians the rule of the father is tyrannical; they use their sons
as slaves. Tyrannical too is the rule of a master over slaves; for it is the advantage of the master
that is brought about in it. Now this seems to be a correct form of government, but the Persian
type is perverted; for the modes of rule appropriate to different relations are diverse. The
association of man and wife seems to be aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance with his
worth, and in those matters in which a man should rule, but the matters that befit a woman he
hands over to her. If the man rules in everything the relation passes over into oligarchy; for in
doing so he is not acting in accordance with their respective worth, and not ruling in virtue of his
superiority. Sometimes, however, women rule, because they are heiresses; so their rule is not in
virtue of excellence but due to wealth and power, as in oligarchies. The association of brothers is
like timocracy; for they are equal, except in so far as they differ in age; hence if they differ much
in age, the friendship is no longer of the fraternal type. Democracy is found chiefly in masterless
dwellings (for here every one is on an equality), and in those in which the ruler is weak and every
one has licence to do as he pleases.
Book 8, Chapter 11
Each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in so far as it involves justice. The
friendship between a king and his subjects depends on an excess of benefits conferred; for he
confers benefits on his subjects if being a good man he cares for them with a view to their
well-being, as a shepherd does for his sheep (whence Homer called Agamemnon 'shepherd of the
peoples'). Such too is the friendship of a father, though this exceeds the other in the greatness of
the benefits conferred; for he is responsible for the existence of his children, which is thought the
greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing.
These things are ascribed to ancestors as well. Further, by nature a father tends to rule over his
sons, ancestors over descendants, a king over his subjects. These friendships imply superiority of
one party over the other, which is why ancestors are honoured. The justice therefore that exists
between persons so related is not the same on both sides but is in every case proportioned to
merit; for that is true of the friendship as well. The friendship of man and wife, again, is the same
that is found in an aristocracy; for it is in accordance with virtue the better gets more of what is
good, and each gets what befits him; and so, too, with the justice in these relations. The friendship
of brothers is like that of comrades; for they are equal and of like age, and such persons are for
the most part like in their feelings and their character. Like this, too, is the friendship appropriate
to timocratic government; for in such a constitution the ideal is for the citizens to be equal and
fair; therefore rule is taken in turn, and on equal terms; and the friendship appropriate here will
correspond.
But in the deviation-forms, as justice hardly exists, so too does friendship. It exists least in the
worst form; in tyranny there is little or no friendship. For where there is nothing common to ruler
and ruled, there is not friendship either, since there is not justice; e.g. between craftsman and tool,
soul and body, master and slave; the latter in each case is benefited by that which uses it, but there
is no friendship nor justice towards lifeless things. But neither is there friendship towards a horse
or an ox, nor to a slave qua slave. For there is nothing common to the two parties; the slave is a
living tool and the tool a lifeless slave. Qua slave then, one cannot be friends with him. But qua
man one can; for there seems to be some justice between any man and any other who can share in
a system of law or be a party to an agreement; therefore there can also be friendship with him in
so far as he is a man. Therefore while in tyrannies friendship and justice hardly exist, in
democracies they exist more fully; for where the citizens are equal they have much in common.
Book 8, Chapter 12
Every form of friendship, then, involves association, as has been said. One might, however, mark
off from the rest both the friendship of kindred and that of comrades. Those of fellow-citizens,
fellow-tribesmen, fellow-voyagers, and the like are more like mere friendships of association; for
they seem to rest on a sort of compact. With them we might class the friendship of host and guest.
The friendship of kinsmen itself, while it seems to be of many kinds, appears to depend in every
case on parental friendship; for parents love their children as being a part of themselves, and
children their parents as being something originating from them. Now (1) arents know their
offspring better than there children know that they are their children, and (2) the originator feels
his offspring to be his own more than the offspring do their begetter; for the product belongs to
the producer (e.g. a tooth or hair or anything else to him whose it is), but the producer does not
belong to the product, or belongs in a less degree. And (3) the length of time produces the same
result; parents love their children as soon as these are born, but children love their parents only
after time has elapsed and they have acquired understanding or the power of discrimination by the
senses. From these considerations it is also plain why mothers love more than fathers do. Parents,
then, love their children as themselves (for their issue are by virtue of their separate existence a
sort of other selves), while children love their parents as being born of them, and brothers love
each other as being born of the same parents; for their identity with them makes them identical
with each other (which is the reason why people talk of 'the same blood', 'the same stock', and so
on). They are, therefore, in a sense the same thing, though in separate individuals. Two things that
contribute greatly to friendship are a common upbringing and similarity of age; for 'two of an age
take to each other', and people brought up together tend to be comrades; whence the friendship of
brothers is akin to that of comrades. And cousins and other kinsmen are bound up together by
derivation from brothers, viz. by being derived from the same parents. They come to be closer
together or farther apart by virtue of the nearness or distance of the original ancestor.
The friendship of children to parents, and of men to gods, is a relation to them as to something
good and superior; for they have conferred the greatest benefits, since they are the causes of their
being and of their nourishment, and of their education from their birth; and this kind of friendship
possesses pleasantness and utility also, more than that of strangers, inasmuch as their life is lived
more in common. The friendship of brothers has the characteristics found in that of comrades (and
especially when these are good), and in general between people who are like each other, inasmuch
as they belong more to each other and start with a love for each other from their very birth, and
inasmuch as those born of the same parents and brought up together and similarly educated are
more akin in character; and the test of time has been applied most fully and convincingly in their
case.
Between other kinsmen friendly relations are found in due proportion. Between man and wife
friendship seems to exist by nature; for man is naturally inclined to form couples-even more than
to form cities, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary than the city, and
reproduction is more common to man with the animals. With the other animals the union extends
only to this point, but human beings live together not only for the sake of reproduction but also
for the various purposes of life; for from the start the functions are divided, and those of man and
woman are different; so they help each other by throwing their peculiar gifts into the common
stock. It is for these reasons that both utility and pleasure seem to be found in this kind of
friendship. But this friendship may be based also on virtue, if the parties are good; for each has its
own virtue and they will delight in the fact. And children seem to be a bond of union (which is the
reason why childless people part more easily); for children are a good common to both and what
is common holds them together.
How man and wife and in general friend and friend ought mutually to behave seems to be the
same question as how it is just for them to behave; for a man does not seem to have the same
duties to a friend, a stranger, a comrade, and a schoolfellow.
Book 8, Chapter 13
There are three kinds of friendship, as we said at the outset of our inquiry, and in respect of each
some are friends on an equality and others by virtue of a superiority (for not only can equally
good men become friends but a better man can make friends with a worse, and similarly in
friendships of pleasure or utility the friends may be equal or unequal in the benefits they confer).
This being so, equals must effect the required equalization on a basis of equality in love and in all
other respects, while unequals must render what is in proportion to their superiority or inferiority.
Complaints and reproaches arise either only or chiefly in the friendship of utility, and this is only
to be expected. For those who are friends on the ground of virtue are anxious to do well by each
other (since that is a mark of virtue and of friendship), and between men who are emulating each
other in this there cannot be complaints or quarrels; no one is offended by a man who loves him
and does well by him-if he is a person of nice feeling he takes his revenge by doing well by the
other. And the man who excels the other in the services he renders will not complain of his friend,
since he gets what he aims at; for each man desires what is good. Nor do complaints arise much
even in friendships of pleasure; for both get at the same time what they desire, if they enjoy
spending their time together; and even a man who complained of another for not affording him
pleasure would seem ridiculous, since it is in his power not to spend his days with him.
But the friendship of utility is full of complaints; for as they use each other for their own interests
they always want to get the better of the bargain, and think they have got less than they should,
and blame their partners because they do not get all they 'want and deserve'; and those who do
well by others cannot help them as much as those whom they benefit want.
Now it seems that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the other legal, one kind of
friendship of utility is moral and the other legal. And so complaints arise most of all when men do
not dissolve the relation in the spirit of the same type of friendship in which they contracted it.
The legal type is that which is on fixed terms; its purely commercial variety is on the basis of
immediate payment, while the more liberal variety allows time but stipulates for a definite quid
pro quo. In this variety the debt is clear and not ambiguous, but in the postponement it contains
an element of friendliness; and so some states do not allow suits arising out of such agreements,
but think men who have bargained on a basis of credit ought to accept the consequences. The
moral type is not on fixed terms; it makes a gift, or does whatever it does, as to a friend; but one
expects to receive as much or more, as having not given but lent; and if a man is worse off when
the relation is dissolved than he was when it was contracted he will complain. This happens
because all or most men, while they wish for what is noble, choose what is advantageous; now it
is noble to do well by another without a view to repayment, but it is the receiving of benefits that
is advantageous. Therefore if we can we should return the equivalent of what we have received
(for we must not make a man our friend against his will; we must recognize that we were
mistaken at the first and took a benefit from a person we should not have taken it from-since it
was not from a friend, nor from one who did it just for the sake of acting so-and we must settle up
just as if we had been benefited on fixed terms). Indeed, one would agree to repay if one could (if
one could not, even the giver would not have expected one to do so); therefore if it is possible we
must repay. But at the outset we must consider the man by whom we are being benefited and on
what terms he is acting, in order that we may accept the benefit on these terms, or else decline it.
It is disputable whether we ought to measure a service by its utility to the receiver and make the
return with a view to that, or by the benevolence of the giver. For those who have received say
they have received from their benefactors what meant little to the latter and what they might have
got from others- minimizing the service; while the givers, on the contrary, say it was the biggest
thing they had, and what could not have been got from others, and that it was given in times of
danger or similar need. Now if the friendship is one that aims at utility, surely the advantage to the
receiver is the measure. For it is he that asks for the service, and the other man helps him on the
assumption that he will receive the equivalent; so the assistance has been precisely as great as the
advantage to the receiver, and therefore he must return as much as he has received, or even more
(for that would be nobler). In friendships based on virtue on the other hand, complaints do not
arise, but the purpose of the doer is a sort of measure; for in purpose lies the essential element of
virtue and character.
Book 8, Chapter 14
Differences arise also in friendships based on superiority; for each expects to get more out of
them, but when this happens the friendship is dissolved. Not only does the better man think he
ought to get more, since more should be assigned to a good man, but the more useful similarly
expects this; they say a useless man should not get as much as they should, since it becomes an act
of public service and not a friendship if the proceeds of the friendship do not answer to the worth
of the benefits conferred. For they think that, as in a commercial partnership those who put more
in get more out, so it should be in friendship. But the man who is in a state of need and inferiority
makes the opposite claim; they think it is the part of a good friend to help those who are in need;
what, they say, is the use of being the friend of a good man or a powerful man, if one is to get
nothing out of it?
At all events it seems that each party is justified in his claim, and that each should get more out of
the friendship than the other-not more of the same thing, however, but the superior more honour
and the inferior more gain; for honour is the prize of virtue and of beneficence, while gain is the
assistance required by inferiority.
It seems to be so in constitutional arrangements also; the man who contributes nothing good to
the common stock is not honoured; for what belongs to the public is given to the man who
benefits the public, and honour does belong to the public. It is not possible to get wealth from the
common stock and at the same time honour. For no one puts up with the smaller share in all
things; therefore to the man who loses in wealth they assign honour and to the man who is willing
to be paid, wealth, since the proportion to merit equalizes the parties and preserves the friendship,
as we have said. This then is also the way in which we should associate with unequals; the man
who is benefited in respect of wealth or virtue must give honour in return, repaying what he can.
For friendship asks a man to do what he can, not what is proportional to the merits of the case;
since that cannot always be done, e.g. in honours paid to the gods or to parents; for no one could
ever return to them the equivalent of what he gets, but the man who serves them to the utmost of
his power is thought to be a good man. This is why it would not seem open to a man to disown
his father (though a father may disown his son); being in debt, he should repay, but there is
nothing by doing which a son will have done the equivalent of what he has received, so that he is
always in debt. But creditors can remit a debt; and a father can therefore do so too. At the same
time it is thought that presumably no one would repudiate a son who was not far gone in
wickedness; for apart from the natural friendship of father and son it is human nature not to reject
a son's assistance. But the son, if he is wicked, will naturally avoid aiding his father, or not be
zealous about it; for most people wish to get benefits, but avoid doing them, as a thing
unprofitable.-So much for these questions.
Book 9, Chapter 1
IN all friendships between dissimilars it is, as we have said, proportion that equalizes the parties
and preserves the friendship; e.g. in the political form of friendship the shoemaker gets a return for
his shoes in proportion to his worth, and the weaver and all other craftsmen do the same. Now
here a common measure has been provided in the form of money, and therefore everything is
referred to this and measured by this; but in the friendship of lovers sometimes the lover
complains that his excess of love is not met by love in return though perhaps there is nothing
lovable about him), while often the beloved complains that the lover who formerly promised
everything now performs nothing. Such incidents happen when the lover loves the beloved for the
sake of pleasure while the beloved loves the lover for the sake of utility, and they do not both
possess the qualities expected of them. If these be the objects of the friendship it is dissolved when
they do not get the things that formed the motives of their love; for each did not love the other
person himself but the qualities he had, and these were not enduring; that is why the friendships
also are transient. But the love of characters, as has been said, endures because it is
self-dependent. Differences arise when what they get is something different and not what they
desire; for it is like getting nothing at all when we do not get what we aim at; compare the story
of the person who made promises to a lyre-player, promising him the more, the better he sang, but
in the morning, when the other demanded the fulfilment of his promises, said that he had given
pleasure for pleasure. Now if this had been what each wanted, all would have been well; but if the
one wanted enjoyment but the other gain, and the one has what he wants while the other has not,
the terms of the association will not have been properly fulfilled; for what each in fact wants is
what he attends to, and it is for the sake of that that that he will give what he has.
But who is to fix the worth of the service; he who makes the sacrifice or he who has got the
advantage? At any rate the other seems to leave it to him. This is what they say Protagoras used
to do; whenever he taught anything whatsoever, he bade the learner assess the value of the
knowledge, and accepted the amount so fixed. But in such matters some men approve of the
saying 'let a man have his fixed reward'. Those who get the money first and then do none of the
things they said they would, owing to the extravagance of their promises, naturally find
themselves the objects of complaint; for they do not fulfil what they agreed to. The sophists are
perhaps compelled to do this because no one would give money for the things they do know.
These people then, if they do not do what they have been paid for, are naturally made the objects
of complaint.
But where there is no contract of service, those who give up something for the sake of the other
party cannot (as we have said) be complained of (for that is the nature of the friendship of virtue),
and the return to them must be made on the basis of their purpose (for it is purpose that is the
characteristic thing in a friend and in virtue). And so too, it seems, should one make a return to
those with whom one has studied philosophy; for their worth cannot be measured against money,
and they can get no honour which will balance their services, but still it is perhaps enough, as it is
with the gods and with one's parents, to give them what one can.
If the gift was not of this sort, but was made with a view to a return, it is no doubt preferable that
the return made should be one that seems fair to both parties, but if this cannot be achieved, it
would seem not only necessary that the person who gets the first service should fix the reward,
but also just; for if the other gets in return the equivalent of the advantage the beneficiary has
received, or the price lie would have paid for the pleasure, he will have got what is fair as from the
other.
We see this happening too with things put up for sale, and in some places there are laws providing
that no actions shall arise out of voluntary contracts, on the assumption that one should settle
with a person to whom one has given credit, in the spirit in which one bargained with him. The
law holds that it is more just that the person to whom credit was given should fix the terms than
that the person who gave credit should do so. For most things are not assessed at the same value
by those who have them and those who want them; each class values highly what is its own and
what it is offering; yet the return is made on the terms fixed by the receiver. But no doubt the
receiver should assess a thing not at what it seems worth when he has it, but at what he assessed it
at before he had it.
Book 9, Chapter 2
A further problem is set by such questions as, whether one should in all things give the preference
to one's father and obey him, or whether when one is ill one should trust a doctor, and when one
has to elect a general should elect a man of military skill; and similarly whether one should render
a service by preference to a friend or to a good man, and should show gratitude to a benefactor or
oblige a friend, if one cannot do both.
All such questions are hard, are they not, to decide with precision? For they admit of many
variations of all sorts in respect both of the magnitude of the service and of its nobility necessity.
But that we should not give the preference in all things to the same person is plain enough; and
we must for the most part return benefits rather than oblige friends, as we must pay back a loan to
a creditor rather than make one to a friend. But perhaps even this is not always true; e.g. should a
man who has been ransomed out of the hands of brigands ransom his ransomer in return, whoever
he may be (or pay him if he has not been captured but demands payment) or should he ransom his
father? It would seem that he should ransom his father in preference even to himself. As we have
said, then, generally the debt should be paid, but if the gift is exceedingly noble or exceedingly
necessary, one should defer to these considerations. For sometimes it is not even fair to return the
equivalent of what one has received, when the one man has done a service to one whom he knows
to be good, while the other makes a return to one whom he believes to be bad. For that matter,
one should sometimes not lend in return to one who has lent to oneself; for the one person lent to
a good man, expecting to recover his loan, while the other has no hope of recovering from one
who is believed to be bad. Therefore if the facts really are so, the demand is not fair; and if they
are not, but people think they are, they would be held to be doing nothing strange in refusing. As
we have often pointed out, then, discussions about feelings and actions have just as much
definiteness as their subject-matter.
That we should not make the same return to every one, nor give a father the preference in
everything, as one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, is plain enough; but since we ought to
render different things to parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors, we ought to render to
each class what is appropriate and becoming. And this is what people seem in fact to do; to
marriages they invite their kinsfolk; for these have a part in the family and therefore in the doings
that affect the family; and at funerals also they think that kinsfolk, before all others, should meet,
for the same reason. And it would be thought that in the matter of food we should help our
parents before all others, since we owe our own nourishment to them, and it is more honourable
to help in this respect the authors of our being even before ourselves; and honour too one should
give to one's parents as one does to the gods, but not any and every honour; for that matter one
should not give the same honour to one's father and one's mother, nor again should one give them
the honour due to a philosopher or to a general, but the honour due to a father, or again to a
mother. To all older persons, too, one should give honour appropriate to their age, by rising to
receive them and finding seats for them and so on; while to comrades and brothers one should
allow freedom of speech and common use of all things. To kinsmen, too, and fellow-tribesmen
and fellow-citizens and to every other class one should always try to assign what is appropriate,
and to compare the claims of each class with respect to nearness of relation and to virtue or
usefulness. The comparison is easier when the persons belong to the same class, and more
laborious when they are different. Yet we must not on that account shrink from the task, but
decide the question as best we can.
Book 9, Chapter 3
Another question that arises is whether friendships should or should not be broken off when the
other party does not remain the same. Perhaps we may say that there is nothing strange in
breaking off a friendship based on utility or pleasure, when our friends no longer have these
attributes. For it was of these attributes that we were the friends; and when these have failed it is
reasonable to love no longer. But one might complain of another if, when he loved us for our
usefulness or pleasantness, he pretended to love us for our character. For, as we said at the
outset, most differences arise between friends when they are not friends in the spirit in which they
think they are. So when a man has deceived himself and has thought he was being loved for his
character, when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame himself; when he
has been deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is just that he should complain against
his deceiver; he will complain with more justice than one does against people who counterfeit the
currency, inasmuch as the wrongdoing is concerned with something more valuable.
But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly and is seen to do so, must one still
love him? Surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved, but only what is good. What
is evil neither can nor should be loved; for it is not one's duty to be a lover of evil, nor to become
like what is bad; and we have said that like is dear like. Must the friendship, then, be forthwith
broken off? Or is this not so in all cases, but only when one's friends are incurable in their
wickedness? If they are capable of being reformed one should rather come to the assistance of
their character or their property, inasmuch as this is better and more characteristic of friendship.
But a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange; for it was
not to a man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend has changed, therefore, and he is
unable to save him, he gives him up.
But if one friend remained the same while the other became better and far outstripped him in
virtue, should the latter treat the former as a friend? Surely he cannot. When the interval is great
this becomes most plain, e.g. in the case of childish friendships; if one friend remained a child in
intellect while the other became a fully developed man, how could they be friends when they
neither approved of the same things nor delighted in and were pained by the same things? For not
even with regard to each other will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw) they cannot be
friends; for they cannot live together. But we have discussed these matters.
Should he, then, behave no otherwise towards him than he would if he had never been his friend?
Surely he should keep a remembrance of their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to
oblige friends rather than strangers, so to those who have been our friends we ought to make
some allowance for our former friendship, when the breach has not been due to excess of
wickedness.
Book 9, Chapter 4
Friendly relations with one's neighbours, and the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to
have proceeded from a man's relations to himself. For (1) we define a friend as one who wishes
and does what is good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend, or (2) as one who wishes his friend
to exist and live, for his sake; which mothers do to their children, and friends do who have come
into conflict. And (3) others define him as one who lives with and (4) has the same tastes as
another, or (5) one who grieves and rejoices with his friend; and this too is found in mothers most
of all. It is by some one of these characterstics that friendship too is defined.
Now each of these is true of the good man's relation to himself (and of all other men in so far as
they think themselves good; virtue and the good man seem, as has been said, to be the measure of
every class of things). For his opinions are harmonious, and he desires the same things with all his
soul; and therefore he wishes for himself what is good and what seems so, and does it (for it is
characteristic of the good man to work out the good), and does so for his own sake (for he does it
for the sake of the intellectual element in him, which is thought to be the man himself); and he
wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially the element by virtue of which he thinks.
For existence is good to the virtuous man, and each man wishes himself what is good, while no
one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become some one else (for that matter,
even now God possesses the good); he wishes for this only on condition of being whatever he is;
and the element that thinks would seem to be the individual man, or to be so more than any other
element in him. And such a man wishes to live with himself; for he does so with pleasure, since
the memories of his past acts are delightful and his hopes for the future are good, and therefore
pleasant. His mind is well stored too with subjects of contemplation. And he grieves and rejoices,
more than any other, with himself; for the same thing is always painful, and the same thing always
pleasant, and not one thing at one time and another at another; he has, so to speak, nothing to
repent of.
Therefore, since each of these characteristics belongs to the good man in relation to himself, and
he is related to his friend as to himself (for his friend is another self), friendship too is thought to
be one of these attributes, and those who have these attributes to be friends. Whether there is or is
not friendship between a man and himself is a question we may dismiss for the present; there
would seem to be friendship in so far as he is two or more, to judge from the afore- mentioned
attributes of friendship, and from the fact that the extreme of friendship is likened to one's love for
oneself.
But the attributes named seem to belong even to the majority of men, poor creatures though they
may be. Are we to say then that in so far as they are satisfied with themselves and think they are
good, they share in these attributes? Certainly no one who is thoroughly bad and impious has
these attributes, or even seems to do so. They hardly belong even to inferior people; for they are
at variance with themselves, and have appetites for some things and rational desires for others.
This is true, for instance, of incontinent people; for they choose, instead of the things they
themselves think good, things that are pleasant but hurtful; while others again, through cowardice
and laziness, shrink from doing what they think best for themselves. And those who have done
many terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even shrink from life and destroy
themselves. And wicked men seek for people with whom to spend their days, and shun
themselves; for they remember many a grevious deed, and anticipate others like them, when they
are by themselves, but when they are with others they forget. And having nothing lovable in them
they have no feeling of love to themselves. Therefore also such men do not rejoice or grieve with
themselves; for their soul is rent by faction, and one element in it by reason of its wickedness
grieves when it abstains from certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and one draws them this
way and the other that, as if they were pulling them in pieces. If a man cannot at the same time be
pained and pleased, at all events after a short time he is pained because he was pleased, and he
could have wished that these things had not been pleasant to him; for bad men are laden with
repentance.
Therefore the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even to himself, because there is
nothing in him to love; so that if to be thus is the height of wretchedness, we should strain every
nerve to avoid wickedness and should endeavour to be good; for so and only so can one be either
friendly to oneself or a friend to another.
Book 9, Chapter 5
Goodwill is a friendly sort of relation, but is not identical with friendship; for one may have
goodwill both towards people whom one does not know, and without their knowing it, but not
friendship. This has indeed been said already.' But goodwill is not even friendly feeling. For it does
not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accompany friendly feeling; and friendly feeling
implies intimacy while goodwill may arise of a sudden, as it does towards competitors in a
contest; we come to feel goodwill for them and to share in their wishes, but we would not do
anything with them; for, as we said, we feel goodwill suddenly and love them only superficially.
Goodwill seems, then, to be a beginning of friendship, as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning
of love. For no one loves if he has not first been delighted by the form of the beloved, but he who
delights in the form of another does not, for all that, love him, but only does so when he also
longs for him when absent and craves for his presence; so too it is not possible for people to be
friends if they have not come to feel goodwill for each other, but those who feel goodwill are not
for all that friends; for they only wish well to those for whom they feel goodwill, and would not
do anything with them nor take trouble for them. And so one might by an extension of the term
friendship say that goodwill is inactive friendship, though when it is prolonged and reaches the
point of intimacy it becomes friendship-not the friendship based on utility nor that based on
pleasure; for goodwill too does not arise on those terms. The man who has received a benefit
bestows goodwill in return for what has been done to him, but in doing so is only doing what is
just; while he who wishes some one to prosper because he hopes for enrichment through him
seems to have goodwill not to him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a friend to another if
he cherishes him for the sake of some use to be made of him. In general, goodwill arises on
account of some excellence and worth, when one man seems to another beautiful or brave or
something of the sort, as we pointed out in the case of competitors in a contest.
Book 9, Chapter 6
Unanimity also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is not identity of opinion; for that
might occur even with people who do not know each other; nor do we say that people who have
the same views on any and every subject are unanimous, e.g. those who agree about the heavenly
bodies (for unanimity about these is not a friendly relation), but we do say that a city is unanimous
when men have the same opinion about what is to their interest, and choose the same actions, and
do what they have resolved in common. It is about things to be done, therefore, that people are
said to be unanimous, and, among these, about matters of consequence and in which it is possible
for both or all parties to get what they want; e.g. a city is unanimous when all its citizens think
that the offices in it should be elective, or that they should form an alliance with Sparta, or that
Pittacus should be their ruler-at a time when he himself was also willing to rule. But when each of
two people wishes himself to have the thing in question, like the captains in the Phoenissae, they
are in a state of faction; for it is not unanimity when each of two parties thinks of the same thing,
whatever that may be, but only when they think of the same thing in the same hands, e.g. when
both the common people and those of the better class wish the best men to rule; for thus and thus
alone do all get what they aim at. Unanimity seems, then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is
commonly said to be; for it is concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence
on our life.
Now such unanimity is found among good men; for they are unanimous both in themselves and
with one another, being, so to say, of one mind (for the wishes of such men are constant and not
at the mercy of opposing currents like a strait of the sea), and they wish for what is just and what
is advantageous, and these are the objects of their common endeavour as well. But bad men
cannot be unanimous except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends, since they aim at
getting more than their share of advantages, while in labour and public service they fall short of
their share; and each man wishing for advantage to himself criticizes his neighbour and stands in
his way; for if people do not watch it carefully the common weal is soon destroyed. The result is
that they are in a state of faction, putting compulsion on each other but unwilling themselves to do
what is just.
Book 9, Chapter 7
Benefactors are thought to love those they have benefited, more than those who have been well
treated love those that have treated them well, and this is discussed as though it were paradoxical.
Most people think it is because the latter are in the position of debtors and the former of creditors;
and therefore as, in the case of loans, debtors wish their creditors did not exist, while creditors
actually take care of the safety of their debtors, so it is thought that benefactors wish the objects
of their action to exist since they will then get their gratitude, while the beneficiaries take no
interest in making this return. Epicharmus would perhaps declare that they say this because they
'look at things on their bad side', but it is quite like human nature; for most people are forgetful,
and are more anxious to be well treated than to treat others well. But the cause would seem to be
more deeply rooted in the nature of things; the case of those who have lent money is not even
analogous. For they have no friendly feeling to their debtors, but only a wish that they may kept
safe with a view to what is to be got from them; while those who have done a service to others
feel friendship and love for those they have served even if these are not of any use to them and
never will be. This is what happens with craftsmen too; every man loves his own handiwork better
than he would be loved by it if it came alive; and this happens perhaps most of all with poets; for
they have an excessive love for their own poems, doting on them as if they were their children.
This is what the position of benefactors is like; for that which they have treated well is their
handiwork, and therefore they love this more than the handiwork does its maker. The cause of
this is that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved, and that we exist by virtue of
activity (i.e. by living and acting), and that the handiwork is in a sense, the producer in activity; he
loves his handiwork, therefore, because he loves existence. And this is rooted in the nature of
things; for what he is in potentiality, his handiwork manifests in activity.
At the same time to the benefactor that is noble which depends on his action, so that he delights in
the object of his action, whereas to the patient there is nothing noble in the agent, but at most
something advantageous, and this is less pleasant and lovable. What is pleasant is the activity of
the present, the hope of the future, the memory of the past; but most pleasant is that which
depends on activity, and similarly this is most lovable. Now for a man who has made something
his work remains (for the noble is lasting), but for the person acted on the utility passes away.
And the memory of noble things is pleasant, but that of useful things is not likely to be pleasant,
or is less so; though the reverse seems true of expectation.
Further, love is like activity, being loved like passivity; and loving and its concomitants are
attributes of those who are the more active.
Again, all men love more what they have won by labour; e.g. those who have made their money
love it more than those who have inherited it; and to be well treated seems to involve no labour,
while to treat others well is a laborious task. These are the reasons, too, why mothers are fonder
of their children than fathers; bringing them into the world costs them more pains, and they know
better that the children are their own. This last point, too, would seem to apply to benefactors.
Book 9, Chapter 8
The question is also debated, whether a man should love himself most, or some one else. People
criticize those who love themselves most, and call them self- lovers, using this as an epithet of
disgrace, and a bad man seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more so the more
wicked he is-and so men reproach him, for instance, with doing nothing of his own accord-while
the good man acts for honour's sake, and the more so the better he is, and acts for his friend's
sake, and sacrifices his own interest.
But the facts clash with these arguments, and this is not surprising. For men say that one ought to
love best one's best friend, and man's best friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish
for his sake, even if no one is to know of it; and these attributes are found most of all in a man's
attitude towards himself, and so are all the other attributes by which a friend is defined; for, as we
have said, it is from this relation that all the characteristics of friendship have extended to our
neighbours. All the proverbs, too, agree with this, e.g. 'a single soul', and 'what friends have is
common property', and 'friendship is equality', and 'charity begins at home'; for all these marks will
be found most in a man's relation to himself; he is his own best friend and therefore ought to love
himself best. It is therefore a reasonable question, which of the two views we should follow; for
both are plausible.
Perhaps we ought to mark off such arguments from each other and determine how far and in what
respects each view is right. Now if we grasp the sense in which each school uses the phrase 'lover
of self', the truth may become evident. Those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe
self-love to people who assign to themselves the greater share of wealth, honours, and bodily
pleasures; for these are what most people desire, and busy themselves about as though they were
the best of all things, which is the reason, too, why they become objects of competition. So those
who are grasping with regard to these things gratify their appetites and in general their feelings
and the irrational element of the soul; and most men are of this nature (which is the reason why
the epithet has come to be used as it is-it takes its meaning from the prevailing type of self-love,
which is a bad one); it is just, therefore, that men who are lovers of self in this way are reproached
for being so. That it is those who give themselves the preference in regard to objects of this sort
that most people usually call lovers of self is plain; for if a man were always anxious that he
himself, above all things, should act justly, temperately, or in accordance with any other of the
virtues, and in general were always to try to secure for himself the honourable course, no one will
call such a man a lover of self or blame him.
But such a man would seem more than the other a lover of self; at all events he assigns to himself
the things that are noblest and best, and gratifies the most authoritative element in and in all things
obeys this; and just as a city or any other systematic whole is most properly identified with the
most authoritative element in it, so is a man; and therefore the man who loves this and gratifies it
is most of all a lover of self. Besides, a man is said to have or not to have self-control according as
his reason has or has not the control, on the assumption that this is the man himself; and the things
men have done on a rational principle are thought most properly their own acts and voluntary
acts. That this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also that the
good man loves most this part of him. Whence it follows that he is most truly a lover of self, of
another type than that which is a matter of reproach, and as different from that as living according
to a rational principle is from living as passion dictates, and desiring what is noble from desiring
what seems advantageous. Those, then, who busy themselves in an exceptional degree with noble
actions all men approve and praise; and if all were to strive towards what is noble and strain every
nerve to do the noblest deeds, everything would be as it should be for the common weal, and
every one would secure for himself the goods that are greatest, since virtue is the greatest of
goods.
Therefore the good man should be a lover of self (for he will both himself profit by doing noble
acts, and will benefit his fellows), but the wicked man should not; for he will hurt both himself and
his neighbours, following as he does evil passions. For the wicked man, what he does clashes with
what he ought to do, but what the good man ought to do he does; for reason in each of its
possessors chooses what is best for itself, and the good man obeys his reason. It is true of the
good man too that he does many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary
dies for them; for he will throw away both wealth and honours and in general the goods that are
objects of competition, gaining for himself nobility; since he would prefer a short period of intense
pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment, a twelvemonth of noble life to many years of humdrum
existence, and one great and noble action to many trivial ones. Now those who die for others
doubtless attain this result; it is therefore a great prize that they choose for themselves. They will
throw away wealth too on condition that their friends will gain more; for while a man's friend
gains wealth he himself achieves nobility; he is therefore assigning the greater good to himself.
The same too is true of honour and office; all these things he will sacrifice to his friend; for this is
noble and laudable for himself. Rightly then is he thought to be good, since he chooses nobility
before all else. But he may even give up actions to his friend; it may be nobler to become the
cause of his friend's acting than to act himself. In all the actions, therefore, that men are praised
for, the good man is seen to assign to himself the greater share in what is noble. In this sense,
then, as has been said, a man should be a lover of self; but in the sense in which most men are so,
he ought not.
Book 9, Chapter 9
It is also disputed whether the happy man will need friends or not. It is said that those who are
supremely happy and self-sufficient have no need of friends; for they have the things that are
good, and therefore being self-sufficient they need nothing further, while a friend, being another
self, furnishes what a man cannot provide by his own effort; whence the saying 'when fortune is
kind, what need of friends?' But it seems strange, when one assigns all good things to the happy
man, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods. And if it is more
characteristic of a friend to do well by another than to be well done by, and to confer benefits is
characteristic of the good man and of virtue, and it is nobler to do well by friends than by
strangers, the good man will need people to do well by. This is why the question is asked whether
we need friends more in prosperity or in adversity, on the assumption that not only does a man in
adversity need people to confer benefits on him, but also those who are prospering need people to
do well by. Surely it is strange, too, to make the supremely happy man a solitary; for no one
would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature and
one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore even the happy man lives with others; for he
has the things that are by nature good. And plainly it is better to spend his days with friends and
good men than with strangers or any chance persons. Therefore the happy man needs friends.
What then is it that the first school means, and in what respect is it right? Is it that most identify
friends with useful people? Of such friends indeed the supremely happy man will have no need,
since he already has the things that are good; nor will he need those whom one makes one's
friends because of their pleasantness, or he will need them only to a small extent (for his life, being
pleasant, has no need of adventitious pleasure); and because he does not need such friends he is
thought not to need friends.
But that is surely not true. For we have said at the outset that happiness is an activity; and activity
plainly comes into being and is not present at the start like a piece of property. If (1) happiness
lies in living and being active, and the good man's activity is virtuous and pleasant in itself, as we
have said at the outset, and (2) a thing's being one's own is one of the attributes that make it
pleasant, and (3) we can contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves and their actions better
than our own, and if the actions of virtuous men who are their friends are pleasant to good men
(since these have both the attributes that are naturally pleasant),-if this be so, the supremely happy
man will need friends of this sort, since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions and actions
that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have both these qualities.
Further, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasantly. Now if he were a solitary, life
would be hard for him; for by oneself it is not easy to be continuously active; but with others and
towards others it is easier. With others therefore his activity will be more continuous, and it is in
itself pleasant, as it ought to be for the man who is supremely happy; for a good man qua good
delights in virtuous actions and is vexed at vicious ones, as a musical man enjoys beautiful tunes
but is pained at bad ones. A certain training in virtue arises also from the company of the good, as
Theognis has said before us.
If we look deeper into the nature of things, a virtuous friend seems to be naturally desirable for a
virtuous man. For that which is good by nature, we have said, is for the virtuous man good and
pleasant in itself. Now life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception in that of
man by the power of perception or thought; and a power is defined by reference to the
corresponding activity, which is the essential thing; therefore life seems to be essentially the act of
perceiving or thinking. And life is among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves,
since it is determinate and the determinate is of the nature of the good; and that which is good by
nature is also good for the virtuous man (which is the reason why life seems pleasant to all men);
but we must not apply this to a wicked and corrupt life nor to a life spent in pain; for such a life is
indeterminate, as are its attributes. The nature of pain will become plainer in what follows. But if
life itself is good and pleasant (which it seems to be, from the very fact that all men desire it, and
particularly those who are good and supremely happy; for to such men life is most desirable, and
their existence is the most supremely happy) and if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who
hears, that he hears, and he who walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities
similarly there is something which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive
that we perceive, and if we think, that we think; and if to perceive that we perceive or think is to
perceive that we exist (for existence was defined as perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that
one lives is in itself one of the things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive
what is good present in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good
men, because to them existence is good and pleasant for they are pleased at the consciousness of
the presence in them of what is in itself good); and if as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his
friend also (for his friend is another self):-if all this be true, as his own being is desirable for each
man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend. Now his being was seen to be desirable because he
perceived his own goodness, and such perception is pleasant in itself. He needs, therefore, to be
conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and this will be realized in their living together and
sharing in discussion and thought; for this is what living together would seem to mean in the case
of man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same place.
If, then, being is in itself desirable for the supremely happy man (since it is by its nature good and
pleasant), and that of his friend is very much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are
desirable. Now that which is desirable for him he must have, or he will be deficient in this respect.
The man who is to be happy will therefore need virtuous friends.
Book 9, Chapter 10
Should we, then, make as many friends as possible, or- as in the case of hospitality it is thought to
be suitable advice, that one should be 'neither a man of many guests nor a man with none'-will that
apply to friendship as well; should a man neither be friendless nor have an excessive number of
friends?
To friends made with a view to utility this saying would seem thoroughly applicable; for to do
services to many people in return is a laborious task and life is not long enough for its
performance. Therefore friends in excess of those who are sufficient for our own life are
superfluous, and hindrances to the noble life; so that we have no need of them. Of friends made
with a view to pleasure, also, few are enough, as a little seasoning in food is enough.
But as regards good friends, should we have as many as possible, or is there a limit to the number
of one's friends, as there is to the size of a city? You cannot make a city of ten men, and if there
are a hundred thousand it is a city no longer. But the proper number is presumably not a single
number, but anything that falls between certain fixed points. So for friends too there is a fixed
number perhaps the largest number with whom one can live together (for that, we found, thought
to be very characteristic of friendship); and that one cannot live with many people and divide
oneself up among them is plain. Further, they too must be friends of one another, if they are all to
spend their days together; and it is a hard business for this condition to be fulfilled with a large
number. It is found difficult, too, to rejoice and to grieve in an intimate way with many people, for
it may likely happen that one has at once to be happy with one friend and to mourn with another.
Presumably, then, it is well not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but as many as are
enough for the purpose of living together; for it would seem actually impossible to be a great
friend to many people. This is why one cannot love several people; love is ideally a sort of excess
of friendship, and that can only be felt towards one person; therefore great friendship too can only
be felt towards a few people. This seems to be confirmed in practice; for we do not find many
people who are friends in the comradely way of friendship, and the famous friendships of this sort
are always between two people. Those who have many friends and mix intimately with them all
are thought to be no one's friend, except in the way proper to fellow- citizens, and such people are
also called obsequious. In the way proper to fellow-citizens, indeed, it is possible to be the friend
of many and yet not be obsequious but a genuinely good man; but one cannot have with many
people the friendship based on virtue and on the character of our friends themselves, and we must
be content if we find even a few such.
Book 9, Chapter 11
Do we need friends more in good fortune or in bad? They are sought after in both; for while men
in adversity need help, in prosperity they need people to live with and to make the objects of their
beneficence; for they wish to do well by others. Friendship, then, is more necessary in bad fortune,
and so it is useful friends that one wants in this case; but it is more noble in good fortune, and so
we also seek for good men as our friends, since it is more desirable to confer benefits on these and
to live with these. For the very presence of friends is pleasant both in good fortune and also in
bad, since grief is lightened when friends sorrow with us. Hence one might ask whether they share
as it were our burden, or-without that happening-their presence by its pleasantness, and the
thought of their grieving with us, make our pain less. Whether it is for these reasons or for some
other that our grief is lightened, is a question that may be dismissed; at all events what we have
described appears to take place.
But their presence seems to contain a mixture of various factors. The very seeing of one's friends
is pleasant, especially if one is in adversity, and becomes a safeguard against grief (for a friend
tends to comfort us both by the sight of him and by his words, if he is tactful, since he knows our
character and the things that please or pain us); but to see him pained at our misfortunes is
painful; for every one shuns being a cause of pain to his friends. For this reason people of a manly
nature guard against making their friends grieve with them, and, unless he be exceptionally
insensible to pain, such a man cannot stand the pain that ensues for his friends, and in general does
not admit fellow-mourners because he is not himself given to mourning; but women and womanly
men enjoy sympathisers in their grief, and love them as friends and companions in sorrow. But in
all things one obviously ought to imitate the better type of person.
On the other hand, the presence of friends in our prosperity implies both a pleasant passing of our
time and the pleasant thought of their pleasure at our own good fortune. For this cause it would
seem that we ought to summon our friends readily to share our good fortunes (for the beneficent
character is a noble one), but summon them to our bad fortunes with hesitation; for we ought to
give them as little a share as possible in our evils whence the saying 'enough is my misfortune'. We
should summon friends to us most of all when they are likely by suffering a few inconveniences to
do us a great service.
Conversely, it is fitting to go unasked and readily to the aid of those in adversity (for it is
characteristic of a friend to render services, and especially to those who are in need and have not
demanded them; such action is nobler and pleasanter for both persons); but when our friends are
prosperous we should join readily in their activities (for they need friends for these too), but be
tardy in coming forward to be the objects of their kindness; for it is not noble to be keen to
receive benefits. Still, we must no doubt avoid getting the reputation of kill- joys by repulsing
them; for that sometimes happens.
The presence of friends, then, seems desirable in all circumstances.
Book 9, Chapter 12
Does it not follow, then, that, as for lovers the sight of the beloved is the thing they love most,
and they prefer this sense to the others because on it love depends most for its being and for its
origin, so for friends the most desirable thing is living together? For friendship is a partnership,
and as a man is to himself, so is he to his friend; now in his own case the consciousness of his
being is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness of his friend's being, and the activity of
this consciousness is produced when they live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this.
And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake they value life,
in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; and so some drink together, others dice
together, others join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each class
spending their days together in whatever they love most in life; for since they wish to live with
their friends, they do and share in those things which give them the sense of living together. Thus
the friendship of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because of their instability they unite in bad
pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming like each other), while the friendship of good
men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too
by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mould of the
characteristics they approve- whence the saying 'noble deeds from noble men'.-So much, then, for
friendship; our next task must be to discuss pleasure.
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